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We study a resource utilization scenario characterized by intrinsic fitness. To describe the growth
and organization of different cities, we consider a model for resource utilization where many restau-
rants compete, as in a game, to attract customers using an iterative learning process. Results for the
case of restaurants with uniform fitness are reported. When fitness is uniformly distributed, it gives
rise to a Zipf law for the number of customers. We perform an exact calculation for the utilization
fraction for the case when choices are made independent of fitness. A variant of the model is also
introduced where the fitness can be treated as an ability to stay in the business. When a restaurant
loses customers, its fitness is replaced by a random fitness. The steady state fitness distribution is
characterized by a power law, while the distribution of the number of customers still follows the
Zipf law, implying the robustness of the model. Our model serves as a paradigm for the emergence
of Zipf law in city size distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The complexity of interactions in human societies have
produced various emergent phenomena [1, 2], often char-
acterized by broad distributions of different quantities.
One of the interesting consequences of economic growth
is urban agglomeration. A striking example of agglom-
eration is expressed as a broad distribution for urban
entities – city sizes, given by their population, and first
reported by Auerbach [3]. Known to be the Zipf law [4],
city sizes follow a simple distribution law: the rank k
of a city with population s goes as sk ∼ 1/k
γ with the
Zipf exponent γ ≈ 1 holding true for most societies and
across time. However, variations to this structure have
also been observed for countries like China or the former
USSR countries [5, 6]. The probability density of city
sizes follow from above, again a power law: P (s) ∼ s−ν
(ν > 0). The exponents of the Zipf plot γ and that
corresponding to the probability density ν are related as
ν = 1 + 1γ [7].
Several studies attempted to derive the Zipf’s law the-
oretically for city-size distributions, specifically for the
case γ = 1. Gabaix [8] argued that if cities grow ran-
domly at the same expected growth rate and the same
variance, the limiting distribution will converge to Zipf’s
law. In a similar approach, resulting in diffusion and mul-
tiplicative processes, produced intermittent spatiotempo-
ral structures [9]. Another study used shocks as a result
of migration [10]. In Ref [8] however, differential pop-
ulation growth resulted from migration. Some simple
economics arguments showed that the expected urban
growth rates were identical across city sizes and vari-
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ations were random normal deviates, and the Zipf law
with exponent unity follows naturally.
Zipf law has also been observed for firm
sizes [11], income distribution of companies [12],
firm bankruptcy [13], etc.
Cities are characterized by their economic output,
wealth, employment, wages, housing condition, crime,
transport and various other amenities [14], and can also
be quantitatively evaluated and ranked using various in-
dices (e.g., Global City index [15]). Historically, cities
have seen birth, growth, competition, migration, decline
and death, but over time, the ranking of cities according
to size is claimed to be following a Zipf law irrespective
of time [16]. While people choose to live in cities decid-
ing on different factors, and compete to make use of the
resources provided by the cities, the migration of popu-
lation across cities to adjust for resources [17] also plays
an important role in the city growth/decay dynamics.
One of the toy models to study resource utilization [18]
is the Kolkata Paise Restaurant (KPR) [19, 20] problem,
which is similar to various adaptive games (see [21]). In
the simplest version, N agents (customers) simultane-
ously choose between equal number R (= N) of restau-
rants, each of which serve only one meal every evening
(generalization to any other number is trivial). Thus,
showing up in a restaurant with more people means less
chance of getting food. The utilization is measured by the
fraction of agents f getting food or equivalently, by mea-
suring its complimentary quantity: the fraction of meals
wasted (1−f), since some restaurants do not get any cus-
tomer at all. A fully random occupancy rule provides a
benchmark of f = 1−1/e ≈ 0.63, while a crowd-avoiding
algorithm [20] improves the utilization to around 0.8. It
was also seen that varying the ratio of the number of
agents to the number of restaurants (N/R) below unity,
one can find a phase transition between a ‘active phase’
characterized by a finite fraction ρa of restaurants with
more than one agent, and an ‘absorbed phase’, where
ρa vanishes [22]. The same crowd avoiding strategy was
2adapted in a version of the Minority Game [21] which
provided the extra information about the crowd and one
could achieve a very small time of convergence to the
steady state, in fact O(log logN) [23]. Another modi-
fication to this problem [24] showed a phase transition
depending on the amount of information that is shared.
The main idea for the above studies was to find simple
algorithms that lead to a state of maximum utilization
in a very short time scale, using iterative learning.
But in reality, resources are never well utilized, and in
fact, socio-economic inequalities are manifested in differ-
ent forms, among which the inequalities in income and
wealth [25, 26] are the most prominent and quite well
studied. While empirical data gave us an idea of the form
of the distribution of income and wealth, various model-
ing efforts have supplemented them to understand why
such inequalities appear. One of the successful modeling
attempts used the kinetic theory of gases [27], where gas
molecules colliding and exchanging energy was mapped
into agents coming together to exchange their wealth,
obeying certain rules [28]. Using savings as a parameter
one can model the entire range of the income/ wealth
distribution. In the models, a pair of agents agree to
trade and each save a fraction λ of their instantaneous
money/wealth and performs a random exchange of the
rest at each trading step. The distribution of wealth
P (m) in the steady state matches well with the character-
istic empirical data. When the saving fraction λ is fixed,
i.e., for homogeneous agents (CC model hereafter) [29],
P (m) resemble Gamma distributions [30]. When λ is dis-
tributed random uniformly in [0, 1) and quenched, (CCM
model hereafter), i.e., for heterogeneous agents, one gets
a Pareto law for the probability density P (m) ∼ m−ν
with exponent ν = 2 [28, 31]. This model uses preferen-
tial attachment [32] with socio-economic ingredients.
In this paper, we connect the setting of the KPR prob-
lem with kinetic exchange models of wealth distribution.
Customers migrate across restaurants depending on their
satisfaction, where the saving fraction of agents in the ki-
netic exchange models of wealth distributions correspond
to the fitness of the restaurants. This serves as a model
for city growth and organization, where the cities cor-
respond to restaurants and the city population to the
customers, who choose to stay or migrate according to
the fitness of the cities.
In Sec. II, we define our model in which each restaurant
has an inherent fitness which keeps agents from going
away to other places. In Sec. III, we perform calcula-
tions for size distributions as well as utilization fraction
for cases with uniform and distributed fitness parame-
ter. In a modified version of the model with fitness, the
results are shown to be robust. In Sec. IV, we discuss
some empirical evidences. We conclude with summary
and discussions in Sec. V.
II. MODEL
In the usual KPR framework ofN agents and R restau-
rants, we take here in the following R = N for the sake
of simplicity. We assume that each restaurant i has a
characteristic fitness pi drawn from a distribution Π(p).
The entire dynamics of the agents is defined by p. The
concept of time is similar in the case of cities in the sense
that people make choices at a certain time scale. Agents
visiting a restaurant i on a particular evening t return on
the next evening t+1 with probability pi, or otherwise go
to any other randomly chosen restaurant. We consider
the dynamics of the agents to be simultaneous.
In terms of cities, we can restate the model as follows:
every city has some fitness and initially people are ran-
domly distributed among the cities. At any point of time,
some people will be satisfied in a city and others will not
be satisfied by its services. According to our model, the
unsatisfied people will shift randomly to any other cities.
The same dynamics happens for other cities too. There-
fore at every time step (which can of the order of days or
months) cities may lose some people and may also gain
some people. We consider different types of fitness dis-
tribution and observe the population distribution for the
cities.
The fitness parameter above is a proxy for a generic
city index [15], which can be any intrinsic property such
as the measure of wealth, economic power, competitive-
ness, resources, infrastructure etc. or a combination of
many of these. It is important to note at this point that
we are using the restaurant model (KPR) paradigm to
model the distribution of sizes of urban agglomerations
(cities), where migration between cities is modeled by the
movement of agents across restaurants.
In order to measure utilization, we further assume that
the restaurants prepare as many meals on a particular
evening as there were customers on the previous evening.
Thus the restaurants learn to minimize their wastage.
The wastage 1 − f given by the unused meals, and the
utilization fraction f can thus be computed. Note that
the utilization fraction f here is different from that used
earlier in Refs. [19, 20, 22, 24] in the sense that restau-
rants here ‘learn’ also to adjust the size of their services
according to their past experience.
III. RESULTS
A. Distribution of sizes
Let us consider the case when pi is uniformly dis-
tributed in [0, 1), i.e, Π(p) = 1. In practice, we use a
natural cutoff for p as 1− 1/N . The probability density
of the number of agents s at a particular restaurant P (s)
has a broad distribution, and in fact a power law for most
of its range, but has a prominent exponential cutoff:
P (s) ∼ s−ν exp(−s/S), (1)
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FIG. 1. (Color online) The probability density P (s) for frac-
tion of restaurants with s agents. The data is shown for dif-
ferent system sizes N = 28, 29, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215. The
power law exponent is compared with s−2.
where S is a constant which determines the scale of the
cutoff. The exponential cutoff is an artifact of the upper
cutoff in Π(p). The power law exponent is ν = 2.00(1) as
measured directly from the fit of the numerical simulation
data (Fig. 1).
Let ai(t) denote the number of customers on the
evening t in the restaurant i characterized by fitness pi
in the steady state. So,
∑
i ai(t) = N . Let n
′ denote
the average number of agents on any evening who are
choosing restaurants randomly. Then, for a restaurant i,
ai(t)pi agents are returning to restaurant i on the next
evening, and an additional n′/N agents on the average
additionally come to that restaurant. This gives
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t)pi + n
′/N, (2)
where ai would now denote the average quantity. In the
steady state, we have ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) = ai and hence
ai(1 − pi) =
n′
N
(3)
giving
ai =
n′
N
1
1− pi
. (4)
These calculations hold for large pi (close to 1) which give
large values of ai close to ai. Thus, for all restaurants,∑
i
ai = N =
n′
N
∑
i
1
1− pi
⇒ n′ =
N2∑
i
1
1−pi
. (5)
Now, let us consider a case of Π(p) = 1, where pi =
1− i/N for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Thus,
n′ =
N∑
i
1
i
≈
N
ln(N + 1)
(6)
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FIG. 2. (Color online) The probability density P (s) for frac-
tion of restaurants with s agents, for different distributions
Π(p) = (1 + δ)(1 − p)δ, with δ = −0.5, 0, 1.0. The power
law exponents agree with ν = 2 + δ. The data are shown for
N = 213.
for large N . We numerically computed P (s) for this
particular case and the computed value of the cutoff in
P (s) which comes from the largest value of pi which is
p1 = 1 − 1/N , and it agrees nicely with our estimated
Eq. 6.
Following Ref. [33], one can derive the form of the size
distribution P (s) easily. Since, R.H.S. of Eq. (3) is a
constant (= C, say), dp = da/a2 = ds/s2, since ai being
the number of agents in restaurant i denotes nothing but
the size s. An agent with a particular fitness p ends up
in a restaurant of characteristic size s given by Eq. (3),
so that one can relate Π(p)dp = P (s)ds. Thus,
P (s) = Π(p)
dp
ds
=
Π
(
1− Cs
)
s2
. (7)
Thus, for an uniform distribution Π(p) = 1, P (s) ∼ s−2
for large s. It also follows that for Π(p) = (1+ δ)(1−p)δ,
one should get
P (s) ∼ s−(2+δ), with − 1 < δ <∞. (8)
Thus ν does not depend on any feature of Π(p) except
on the nature of this function near p = 1, i.e., the value
of δ, giving ν = 2 + δ.
Eq. 8 can also be derived in an alternative way. The
fraction of redistributed people n′/N choose N restau-
rants randomly, and thus its distribution is Poissonian
of some parameter c. The stationary distribution of ai
is also Poissonian of parameter c/(1 − pi). The average
distribution over pi can hence be computed exactly as
P (a) =
δ + 1
a!
∫ 1−ǫ
0
dp(1− p)δ
(
c
1− p
)a
exp
(
−
c
(1− p)
)
=
(δ + 1)cδ+1
a!
∫ c/ǫ
c
ua−2−δ exp(−u)du, (9)
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Utilization fraction f in the model (a) with fixed fitness p. The data is shown for N = 1024. The dotted
line gives the analytical estimate. (b) f for the case of uniformly distributed p i.e., for Π(p) = 1: pi = 1 − i/N (red squares)
and uniformly random (blue circles) for various system sizes N . The inset shows the variation of f with 1/ lnN . Error bars
are also shown.
where ǫ = 1/N
1
δ+1 is a cutoff, in particular necessary for
δ = 0, and
c =
{
1
(δ+1)
∫ 1−ǫ
0 dp(1− p)
δ−1 = δ(δ+1) , if δ > 0,
1
log(1/ǫ) =
1
log(N) , if δ = 0.
(10)
If the bounds of the above integral (Eq. 9) can be put
respectively to 0 and ∞, for an intermediate range of a
one gets
P (a) ∼
(a− 2− δ)!
a!
∼ a−(2+δ), when a≫ 2 + δ, (11)
which leads to the result below Eq. 8, while Eq. 8 is only
valid for large a.
In Fig. 2 we compare the numerical simulation results
for Π(p) = (1+ δ)(1− p)δ and indeed find the agreement
ν = 2 + δ.
At this point, it is worthwhile to mention the case when
restaurants have the same fitness, pi = p ∀i. The p = 0
case is trivial and same as our random benchmark. The
size distribution P (s) is Poissonian: P (s) = 1s! exp(−1).
For 0 < p < 1, P (s) does not show any difference, except
in the largest values of s. Trivially, the p = 1 case has
no dynamics. This is strikingly different from the CC
model [29], where the wealth distribution P (m) resembles
Gamma distributions [30], with the maxima for λ = 0 at
m = 0 monotonically going to m = 1 for λ→ 1, m being
calculated in units of average money per agent. However,
in the limit of g = N/R≫ 1 (continuum limit), the above
models will reproduce results of CC and CCM.
B. Utilization
We further assume that the restaurants prepare as
many meals on a particular evening as there were cus-
tomers on the previous evening. We define utilization
fraction f as the average fraction of agents getting food.
Thus, formally,
f =
〈
1
N
∑
i
min[ai(t), ai(t+ 1)]
〉
, (12)
where the bar means time average in the steady state and
〈. . .〉 means ensemble average. Thus, Eq. 12 computed
in the steady state will give the steady state value of
utilization f .
Let us consider the case when the agents choose restau-
rants randomly. The utilization fraction f is about
0.476(5) as computed from numerical simulations. We
can provide an analytical argument for this.
The probability of finding a restaurant with exactly m
agents is given by
π(m) =
1
m!
exp(−1). (13)
In the steady state, π(m) fraction of restaurants each
provide m meals. Then the fraction of agents not getting
food can be calculated exactly, and is given by
1− f = π(0) + π(1)[1.π(2) + 2.π(3) + . . .]
+ π(2)[1.π(3) + 2.π(4) + . . .]
+ π(3)[1.π(4) + 2.π(5) + . . .] + . . . (14)
= π(0) +
∞∑
r=1
∞∑
r′=r+1
π(r)π(r′)(r′ − r). (15)
Eq. (15) can be computed to any degree of accuracy. The
series for its first four terms, i.e., keeping upto r = 3,
5gives 1− f = 1e +
1
e2 +
1
2e2 (3− e)+
1
6e2
(
11
2 − 2e
)
≈ 0.523.
Thus, f ≈ 0.477 which compares pretty well with the
numerical simulations.
However, when all restaurants have the same fitness (=
p), the fraction of agents choosing restaurants randomly
is l = 1 − p, who are mobile agents, while 1 − l fraction
of agents are immobile. Then, for this mobile fraction
l, the probability of finding a restaurant with exactly m
mobile agents will be a Poissonian
π(m) =
lm
m!
exp(−l). (16)
Then, we will basically have Eq. 15 with π(m) given by
Eq. 16. Thus,
1− F (l) = e−l + (l2e−l − le−l + le−2l)
+
(
l3e−l
2
− l2e−l +
l3e−2l
2
+ l2e−2l
)
+ . . . , (17)
where F (.) is the contribution to utilization from the mo-
bile agents. Now, the total utilization fraction will con-
stitute of the contributions of the mobile and immobile
agents:
f(p) = lF (l) + (1 − l) = (1− p)F (1− p) + p. (18)
We compute Eq. 18 upto 3 terms in the series, and plot
in Fig. 3a, and compare with numerical simulations. In
fact, f(p) → 1 as p → 1, which can easily be explained
from the fact that at the limit of p → 1, there is hardly
any fluctuation and ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) identically.
For the case when Π(p) = 1, we observe that f grows
with system size N , roughly as 1− b/ lnN , which tells us
that f → 1 as N →∞ (Fig. 3b). Thus, for large systems,
it is possible to attain full utilization.
C. Evolution with fitness
Here we apply a new strategy for the model, as follows:
initially all the restaurants are given the same values of
p and one agent per restaurant. Each day agents go to
the restaurants obeying the rule as described in previous
section i.e., each agent will return to the same restau-
rant with probability p or choose any other restaurant
uniformly. By this strategy, some of the restaurants will
lose agents and correspondingly some will gain agents
compared to previous day’s attendance. Fitness plays
an important role in the evolutionary models of species
(see e.g., Ref. [34]). Let only the restaurants which lose
agents refresh their fitness p by a new value randomly
drawn from Π(p) = (1 + δ)(1− p)δ in [0, 1) for next day.
This process may actually mean that a restaurant per-
forming badly goes out of business and is replaced by a
new one. In the context of cities, this might mimic a pro-
cess of city decline/death and a subsequent emergence of
a new city.
We study the problem for two cases: where we do not
use any cutoff for p (Case I) and where a natural cutoff
in p is used (Case II).
Case I: N restaurants are initially assigned the same
value of p and one agent in each restaurant, and the dy-
namics is as described above, but the new values of p
are drawn from a uniform random distribution in [0, 1)
(i.e., δ = 0). The agent distribution P (s) in the steady
state follows a power law with exponent ν = 2. Also the
steady state distribution D(p) of p in higher value of p
behaves as
D(p) =
A
(1 − p)ζ
+B, (19)
where A,B are constants and ζ ≃ 0.5, as shown in
Fig. 4a. We checked numerically for several values of
δ and find that the relation
ζ = δ −
1
2
(20)
holds. Here we use D(p) to distinguish from Π(p), the
former being generated out of the dynamics, while the
latter is a pre-determined distribution.
Case II: To avoid the condensation, we use a cutoff for
p. For δ = 0 we allowed the highest value for p to be 1−
1/N2. We choose this cutoff since ζ = −1/2 near p = 1,
which gives the cutoff to be ǫ = 1/N
1
1+ζ = 1/N2. We find
that same power law behavior with an exponential cutoff.
Additionally, the system is ergodic; we observe that agent
distribution Pi(s) at any randomly selected restaurant i
is the same as the agents distribution computed from all
restaurants (see Fig. 4c). Eq. 19 and Eq. 20 still hold
true.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES
In Fig. 5, we plot the size s of cities, communes, mu-
nicipalities and their rank k according to size for several
countries across the world, and one typically observes
variations in the exponents. The slopes of the curves
basically give the power law exponent 1/γ = ν− 1 corre-
sponding to the Zipf law. We computed these exponents
at the tail of the distributions using maximum likelihood
estimates (MLE) [35] and subsequently calculated γ, as
shown in Table. I.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
The social and economic reasons for the development of
an urban agglomeration or a city [43] involve growth over
time as well as migration, decay, as well as death, due to
natural or economic (industrial) reasons. In this article
we model city growth as a resource utilization problem,
specifically in the context of city size distributions. Zipf
law for city size distribution can be thought to be a conse-
quence of the variation in the quality of available services,
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which can be measured in terms of various amenities. We
argue that this measure can be characterized by an intrin-
sic fitness. We make a correspondence from the popula-
tion in cities to the number of customers in restaurants in
the framework of the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem,
where each restaurant is characterized by an intrinsic fit-
ness p similar to the difference in the quality of services in
different cities. The basic model is introduced in Sec. II.
In Sec. III A, we calculate the size distributions, and in
Sec. III B, the exact value of the utilization fraction for
the case when choices are made independent of fitness.
Results for the case with uniform fitness are also reported
there. When fitness is uniformly distributed, it can give
rise to a power (Zipf) law for the number of customers in
each restaurant. We investigate a variant of the model
(Sec. III C) where the fitness can be seen as the ability to
stay in the business. When a restaurant loses customers,
its fitness is refreshed with another random value. In the
TABLE I. Zipf exponents for different countries, computed
using MLE. For USA, we used two data sets: cities with
population above 50, 000, and for Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA). For India, data for cities with population above
100, 000 are used.
Country Year demarcation γ
USA [36] 2012 city population > 50, 000 0.74(2)
USA [36] 2012 MSA 0.91(2)
France [37] 2006 commune 0.67(1)
Germany [38] 2011 city & commune 0.85(2)
Spain [39] 2011 municipality 0.77(1)
Italy [40] 2010 commune 0.77(1)
Brasil [41] 2012 city 0.88(1)
India [42] 2011 city population > 100, 000 0.63(1)
steady state, the power-law distribution of the number
of customers still holds, implying the robustness of the
model (with fitness distribution characterized by power
laws). Using a simple mechanism in which agents com-
pete for available resources, and find the best solution
using iterative learning, we show that the emergent size
distribution given by the number of customers in restau-
rants is a power law. It may be noted that even though we
consider here the particular case of N = R, the possibil-
ity that the restaurants (cities) adjust (learn) their fitness
according to the past experience, induce the power law
distribution of the customers (Sec. III C), leaving many
restaurants (cities) vacant or dead.
Although our model, using a very simple mechanism
of migration of agents in a system of cities (restaurants)
with a random fitness distribution reproduces the Zipf
law, we have not taken into consideration any spatial
structure, the costs incurred in migration/transport of
agents (cf. Ref. [44]), and the spatial organization of fa-
cilities [45] which may emerge as important factors that
drive the flow of population from one city to another.
We did not incorporate several details of social organiza-
tion but kept the bare essential ingredients that can give
rise to Zipf law. Although our study limits to a mean
field scenario, being defined on a regular, fully connected
7network, one can as well study the problem on directed
networks [46] which takes into account the asymmetry in
the flows between different nodes (cities).
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